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Abstract— In this work, the role of noisy feedback in enhancing
the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is investigated. A
model is considered in which the feed-forward and feedback
signals share the same noisy channel. More specifically, a discrete
memoryless modulo-additive channel with a full-duplex destina-
tion node is considered first, and it is shown that a judicious
use of feedback increases the perfect secrecy capacity to the
capacity of the source-destination channel in the absence of
the wiretapper. In the achievability scheme, the feedback signal
corresponds to a private key, known only to the destination. Then
a half-duplex system is considered, for which a novel feedback
technique that always achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate
(even when the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the
source-destination channel) is proposed. These results hinge on
the modulo-additive property of the channel, which is exploited
by the destination to perform encryption over the channel without
revealing its key to the source.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner introduced the wiretap channel in [1] and established
the possibility of creating an almost perfectly secure source-
destination link without relying on private (secret) keys. In the
wiretap channel, both the wiretapper and destination observe
the source encoded message through noisy channels, while
the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computational re-
sources. Wyner showed that when the source-wiretapper chan-
nel is a degraded version of the source-destination channel, the
source can send perfectly secure messages to the destination
at a non-zero rate. The main idea is to hide the information
stream in the additional noise impairing the wiretapper by
using a stochastic encoder which maps each message to many
codewords according to an appropriate probability distribution.
By doing this, one induces maximal equivocation at the
wiretapper. By ensuring that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily
close to the message rate, one achieves perfect secrecy in
the sense that the wiretapper is now limited to learn almost
nothing about the source-destination messages from its ob-
servations. Csisz´ar and Ko¨rner generalized Wyner’s approach
by considering the transmission of confidential messages over
broadcast channels [2]. This work characterized the perfect
secrecy capacity of the Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC),
and showed that the perfect secrecy capacity is positive unless
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the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-
destination channel (referred to as the main channel in the
sequel).
Positive secrecy capacity is not always possible to achieve
in practice. In an attempt to transmit messages securely in
these unfavorable scenarios, [3] and [4] considered the wiretap
channel with noiseless feedback (The authors also considered
a more general secret sharing problem.). These works showed
that one may leverage the feedback to achieve a positive
perfect secrecy rate, even when the feed-forward perfect
secrecy capacity is zero. In this model, there exists a separate
noiseless public channel, through which the transmitter and
receiver can exchange information. The wiretapper is assumed
to obtain a perfect copy of the messages transmitted over this
public channel. Upper and lower bounds were derived for the
perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback in [3], [4].
In several cases, as discussed in detail in the sequel, these
bounds coincide. But, in general, the perfect secrecy capacity
with noiseless feedback remains unknown.
Our work represents a marked departure from the public
discussion paradigm. In our model, we do not assume the
existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. Instead,
the feedback signal from the destination, which is allowed
to depend on the signal received so far, is transmitted over
the same noisy channel used by the source. Based on the
noisy feedback signal, the source can then causally adapt its
transmission scheme, hoping to increase the perfect secrecy
rate. The wiretapper receives a mixture of the signal from the
source and the feedback signal from the destination. Quite
interestingly, we show that in the modulo-additive DMC with
a full-duplex destination, the perfect secrecy capacity with
noisy feedback equals the capacity of the main channel in
the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the capacity is
achieved with a simple scheme in which the source ignores the
feedback signal and the destination feeds back randomly gen-
erated symbols from a certain finite alphabet. This feedback
signal plays the role of a private key, known only by the des-
tination, and encryption is performed by the modulo-additive
channel. The more challenging scenario with a half-duplex
destination, which cannot transmit and receive simultaneously,
is considered next. Here, the active transmission periods of
the destination will introduce erasures in the feed-forward
source-destination channel. In this setting, we propose a novel
feedback scheme that achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate
for any non-trivial channel distribution. The feedback signal
in our approach acts as a private destination only key which
strikes the optimal tradeoff between introducing erasures at
the destination and errors at the wiretapper. Overall, our
work proposes a novel approach for encryption where 1) the
feedback signal is used as a private key known only to the
destination; and 2) the encryption is performed by exploiting
the modulo-additive property of the channel. This encryption
approach is shown to be significantly superior to the classical
public discussion paradigm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we introduce the system model and our notation. Section III
describes and analyzes the proposed feedback scheme which
achieves the capacity of the full duplex modulo-additive DMC.
Taking the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) as an example,
we then compare the performance of the proposed scheme
with the public discussion approach. The half-duplex scenario
is studied in Section IV. Finally, Section V offers some
concluding remarks and outlines possible avenues for future
research.
II. THE MODULO-ADDITIVE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS
CHANNEL
The modulo-additive discrete memoryless wiretap channel
is described by the following relations
Y (i) = X(i) +N1(i),
Z(i) = X(i) +N2(i),
where, at time i = 1, · · · , n, Y (i) is the received symbol
at the destination, Z(i) is the received symbol at the wire-
tapper, X(i) is the channel input, N1(i) and N2(i) are the
noise samples at the destination and wiretapper, respectively.
Here N1(i) and N2(i) are allowed to be correlated, while
each process is assumed to be individually drawn from an
independent and identically distributed source. Also we have
X(i) ∈ X = {0, 1, · · · , |X | − 1}, Y (i), N1(i) ∈ Y =
{0, 1, · · · , |Y|−1} and Z(i), N2(i) ∈ Z = {0, 1, · · · , |Z|−1}
with finite alphabet sizes |X |, |Y| and |Z| respectively. Here
‘+’ is understood to be modulo addition with respect to the
corresponding alphabet size, i.e., Y (i) = [X(i) + N1(i)]
mod |Y| and Z(i) = [X(i) +N2(i)] mod |Z| with addition
in the real field.
In this paper, we focus on the wiretap channel with noisy
feedback. More specifically, at time i the destination sends
the causal feedback signal X1(i) over the same noisy channel
used for feed-forward transmission, i.e., we do not assume the
existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. The causal
feedback signal is allowed to depend on the signal received
to that point Y i−1, i.e., X1(i) = Ψ(Y i−1), where Ψ can be
any (possibly stochastic) function. In general, we allow the
destination to choose the alphabet of the feedback signal X1
and the corresponding size |X1|. With this noisy feedback from
the destination, the received signal at the source, wiretapper
and destination are
Y0(i) = X(i) +X1(i) +N0(i),
Y (i) = X(i) +X1(i) +N1(i),
and
Z(i) = X(i) +X1(i) +N2(i),
respectively. Here Y0(i) ∈ Y0 = {0, 1, · · · , |Y0| − 1} is the
received noisy feedback signal at the source and N0(i) is
the feedback noise, which may be correlated with N1(i) and
N2(i). We denote the alphabet size of N0(i) and Y0(i) by |Y0|.
Again, all ‘+’ operation should be understood to be modulo
addition with corresponding alphabet size.
Now, the source wishes to send the message W ∈ W =
{1, · · · ,M} to the destination using an (M,n) code consisting
of: 1) a casual stochastic encoder f at the source that maps
the message w and the received noisy feedback signal yi−10 to
a codeword x ∈ Xn with
x(i) = f(i, w, yi−10 ),
2) a stochastic feedback encoder Ψ at the destination that maps
the received signal into X1(i) with x1(i) = Ψ(yi−1), and 3) a
decoding function at the destination d: Yn →W . The average
error probability of the (M,n) code is
Pne =
∑
w∈W
1
M
Pr{d(y) 6= w|w was sent}.
The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as
Re =
1
n
H(W |Z).
We are interested in achievable perfectly secure transmission
rates defined as follows.
Definition 1: A secrecy rate Rf is said to be achievable
over the wiretap channel with noisy feedback if for any ǫ > 0,
there exists an integer n(ǫ) and a sequence of codes (M,n)
such that for all n ≥ n(ǫ), we have
Rf =
1
n
log2M, (1)
Pne ≤ ǫ, (2)
and
1
n
H(W |Z) ≥ Rf − ǫ. (3)
Definition 2: The secrecy capacity with noisy feedback Cfs
is the maximal rate at which messages can be sent to the
destination with perfect secrecy; i.e.
Cfs = sup
f,d,Ψ
{Rf : Rf is achievable}.
Note that in our model, the wiretapper is assumed to have
unlimited computational resources and to know the coding
scheme of the source and the feedback function Ψ used by
the destination. We believe that our feedback model captures
realistic scenarios in which the terminals exchange information
over noisy channels.
III. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FULL-DUPLEX
FEEDBACK
A. Known Results
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap DMC without feedback
Cs was characterized in [2]. Specializing to our modulo-
additive channel, one obtains
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]+. (4)
The wiretap DMC with public discussion was introduced
and analyzed in [3], [4]. More specifically, these papers
considered a more general model in which all the nodes
observe correlated variables ( The wiretap channel model is a
particular mechanism for the nodes to observe the correlated
variables, and corresponds to the “channel type model” studied
in [4].), and there exists an extra noiseless public channel
with infinite capacity, through which both the source and the
destination can send information. Combining the correlated
variables and the publicly discussed messages, the source and
the destination generate a key about which the wiretap has
negligible information. Please refer to [4] for rigorous defini-
tions of these notions. Since the public discussion channel is
noiseless, the wiretapper is assumed to observe a noiseless
version of the information transmitted over it. It is worth
noting that some of the schemes proposed in [3], [4] manage
only to generate an identical secret key at both the source and
destination. The source may then need to encrypt its message
using the one-time pad scheme which reduces the effective
source-destination information rate. Thus, the effective secrecy
rate that could be used to transmit information from the source
to the destination may be less than the results reported in [3],
[4]. Nevertheless, we use these results for comparison purposes
(which is thus generous to the public discussion paradigm).
The following theorem gives upper and lower bounds on the
secret key capacity of the public discussion paradigm Cps .
Theorem 1 ( [3], [4]): The secret key capacity of the pub-
lic discussion approach satisfies the following conditions:
max{max
PX
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)],max
PX
[I(X ;Y )− I(Y ;Z)]}
≤ Cps ≤ min{max
PX
I(X ;Y ),max
PX
I(X ;Y |Z)}.
Proof: Please refer to [3], [4].
These bounds are known to be tight in the following
cases [3], [4].
1) PY Z|X = PY |XPZ|X , i.e., the main channel and the
source-wiretapper channel are independent; in this case
Cps = max
PX
{I(X ;Y )− I(Y ;Z)}. (5)
2) PXZ|Y = PX|Y PZ|Y , i.e., X → Y → Z forms a
Markov chain, and hence the source-wiretapper channel
is a degraded version of the main channel. In this case
Cps = max
PX
{I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)}. (6)
This is also the secrecy capacity of the degraded wire-
tap channel without feedback. Hence public discussion
does not increase the secrecy capacity for the degraded
wiretap channel.
3) PXY |Z = PX|ZPY |Z , i.e., X → Z → Y , so that
the main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap
channel. In this case
Cps = 0. (7)
Again, public discussion does not help in this scenario.
B. The Main Result
The following theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of
the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. Moreover, achiev-
ability is established through a novel encryption scheme that
exploits the modulo-additive structure of the channel and uses
a private key known only to the destination.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the discrete memory-
less modulo-additive wiretap channel with noisy feedback is
Cfs = C,
where C is the capacity of the main channel in the absence
of the wiretapper.
Proof: (Sketch) For the converse part, we first upper
bound the secrecy capacity with feedback by the channel
capacity with feedback in the absence of the wiretapper, by
ignoring the equivocation condition (3). Since feedback does
not increase the channel capacity of the DMC, the channel
capacity with feedback in the absence of the wiretapper is C,
which completes the converse part.
For the achievability part, we use the following novel
scheme. The source ignores the feedback signal and uses a
channel coding scheme for the ordinary channel without a
wiretapper. The destination sets X1 = Z , and at any time i
sets X1(i) = a, where a is chosen randomly and equiprobably
from {0, · · · , |Z|−1}. Hence X1 is uniformly distributed over
Zn. After receiving Y, the destination first sets Yˆ = Y−X1,
and then obtains an estimate of the codeword by finding an
Xˆ that is jointly typical with Yˆ. It can be shown that the
error probability at the destination can be made arbitrarily
small. The wiretapper receives Z = X + X1 + N2, which
can be shown to be uniformly distributed over Zn for any
realizations of X and N2. Hence I(X ;Z) = 0, which further
implies I(W ;Z) = 0 by the data processing inequality.
Please refer to [5] for further details.
Our scheme achieves I(W ;Z) = 0. This implies perfect
secrecy in the strong sense of Shannon [6] as opposed to
Wyner’s notion of perfect secrecy [1], which has been pointed
out to be insufficient for certain cryptographic applications [7].
The enabling observation behind our achievability scheme is
that, by judiciously exploiting the modulo-additive structure
of the channel, one can render the channel output at the
wiretapper independent of the codeword transmitted by the
source. Here, the feedback signal X1 serves as a private key
and the encryption operation is carried out by the channel.
Instead of requiring both the source and destination to know a
common encryption key, we show that only the destination
needs to know the encryption key, hence eliminating the
burden of secret key distribution. Remarkably, the secrecy
capacity with noisy feedback is shown to be larger than the
secret key capacity of public discussion schemes. This point
will be further illustrated by the binary symmetric channel
example discussed next. This presents a marked departure
from the conventional wisdom, inspired by the data process-
ing inequality, which suggests the superiority of noiseless
feedback. This result is due to the fact that the noiseless
feedback signal is also available to the wiretapper, while in
the proposed noisy feedback scheme neither the source nor
the wiretapper knows the feedback signal perfectly. In fact,
the source in our scheme ignores the feedback signal, which is
used primarily to confuse the wiretapper. Our result shows that
complicated feedback functions Ψ are not needed to achieve
optimal performance in this setting (i.e., a random number
generator suffices). Also, the alphabet size of the feedback
signal can be set equal to the alphabet size of the wiretapper
channel and the coding scheme used by the source is the same
as the one used in the absence of the wiretapper.
C. The Binary Symmetric Channel Example
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Fig. 1. The Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel.
To illustrate the idea of encryption over the channel, we
consider in some details the wiretap BSC shown in Figure 1,
where X = Y = Z = {0, 1}, Pr{N1(i) = 1} = ǫ and
Pr{N2(i) = 1} = δ. The secrecy capacity of this channel
without feedback is known to be [3]
Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]
+,
with H(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1 − x). We differentiate
among the following special cases.
1) ǫ = δ = 0.
In this case, both the main channel and wiretap channel
are noiseless, hence Cs = 0. Also we have Cps = 0,
since the wiretapper sees exactly the same as what the
destination sees. Specializing our scheme to this BSC
channel, at time i, the destination randomly chooses
X1(i) = 1 with probability 1/2 and sends X1(i) over
the channel. This creates a virtual BSC at the wiretapper
with δ′ = 1/2. On the other hand, since the destination
knows the value of X1(i), it can cancel it by adding
X1(i) to the received signal. This converts the original
channel to an equivalent BSC with ǫ′ = 0. Hence,
through our noisy feedback approach, we obtain an
equivalent wiretap BSC with parameters ǫ′ = 0 and
δ
′
= 1/2 resulting in Cfs = H(δ
′
)−H(ǫ
′
) = 1.
2) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2, N1(i) and N2(i) are independent.
Since δ < ǫ, we have Cs = 0. Also, N1(i) and N2(i) are
independent, so PY Z|X = PY |XPZ|X . Then from (5),
one can easily obtain that [3] Cps = H(ǫ + δ − 2ǫδ) −
H(ǫ).
Our feedback scheme, on the other hand, achieves Cfs =
1−H(ǫ). Since H(ǫ+ δ− 2ǫδ) ≤ 1, we have Cfs ≥ Cps
with equality if and only if ǫ + δ − 2ǫδ = 1/2.
3) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2 and N1(i) = N2(i) + N ′(i), where
Pr{N
′
(i) = 1} = (ǫ− δ)/(1 − 2δ).
The main channel is a degraded version of the source-
wiretapper channel, X → Z → Y , as shown in Figure 2.
X Z Y
Fig. 2. The BSC Wiretap Channel with a Degraded Main Channel.
Hence, from (7), we have Cs = Cps = 0, while Cfs =
1−H(ǫ).
4) 0 < ǫ < δ < 1/2, and N2(i) = N1(i) + N ′(i), where
Pr{N
′
(i) = 1} = (δ − ǫ)/(1− 2ǫ).
X ZY
Fig. 3. The BSC wiretap Channel with a Degraded Source-Wiretapper
Channel.
In this case, the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded
version of the main channel as shown in Figure 3; X →
Y → Z , so from (6) Cs = Cps = H(δ) − H(ǫ). But
Cfs = 1 − H(ǫ) ≥ C
p
s with equality if and only if
δ = 1/2.
5) N1(i) and N2(i) are correlated and the channel is not
degraded.
In this case Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]+. The value of Cps is
unknown in this case but can be bounded by
Cs = [H(δ)−H(ǫ)]
+ ≤ Cps ≤ 1−H(ǫ) = C
f
s .
In summary, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is
always larger than or equal to that of the public discussion
paradigm when the underlying wiretap channel is a BSC. More
strongly, the gain offered by the noisy feedback approach, over
the public discussion paradigm, is rather significant in many
relevant special cases.
IV. EVEN HALF-DUPLEX FEEDBACK IS SUFFICIENT
It is reasonable to argue against the practicality of the full
duplex assumption adopted in the previous section. For exam-
ple, in the wireless setting, nodes may not be able to transmit
and receive with the same degree of freedom due to the large
difference between the power levels of the transmit and receive
chains. This motivates extending our results to the half duplex
wiretap channel in which the terminals can either transmit or
receive but never both at the same time. Under this situation,
if the destination wishes to feed back at time i, it loses
the opportunity to receive the ith symbol transmitted by the
source, which effectively results in an erasure (assuming that
the source is unaware of the destination’s decision). The proper
feedback strategy must, therefore, strike a balance between
confusing the wiretapper and degrading the source-destination
link. In order to simplify the following presentation, we first
focus on the wiretap BSC. The extension to arbitrary modulo-
additive channels is briefly outlined afterwards.
In the full-duplex case, at any time i, the optimal scheme is
to let the destination send X1(i), which equals 0 or 1 equiprob-
ably. But in the half-duplex case, if the destination always
keeps sending, it does not have a chance to receive information
from the source, and hence, the achievable secrecy rate is zero.
This problem, however, can be solved by observing that if at
time i, X1(i) = 0, the signal the wiretapper receives, i.e.,
Z(i) = X1(i) + N2(i), is the same as in the case in which
the destination does not transmit. The only crucial difference
in this case is that the wiretapper does not know whether the
feedback has taken place or not, since X1(i) can be randomly
generated at the destination and kept private.
The previous discussion inspires the following feedback
scheme for the half-duplex channel. The destination first fixes
a value t ∈ [0, 1] which is revealed to both the source and
wiretapper. At time i, the destination randomly generates
X1(i) = 1 with probability t and X1(i) = 0 with probability
1 − t. If X1(i) = 1, the destination sends X1(i) over the
channel, which causes an erasure at the destination and a
potential error at the wiretapper. On the other hand, when
X1(i) = 0, the destination does not send a feedback signal
and spends the time on receiving from the channel. The key
to this scheme is that although the source and wiretapper
know t, neither is aware of the exact timing of the event
{X1(i) = 1}. The source ignores the feedback and keeps
sending information. The following result characterizes the
achievable secrecy rate with the proposed feedback scheme.
Theorem 3: For a BSC with half-duplex nodes and param-
eters ǫ and δ, the scheme proposed above achieves
Rfs= max
µ,t
[
(1− t)
[
H(ǫ+ µ− 2µǫ)−H(ǫ)
]
−
[
H(δˆ + µ− 2µδˆ)−H(δˆ)
]]+
,
with δˆ = δ + t− 2δt.
In general, one can obtain the optimal values of µ and t by
setting the partial derivatives of Rf , with respect to µ and t
to 0, and solving the corresponding equations. Unfortunately,
except for some special cases, we do not have a closed form
solution for these equations at the moment. Interestingly, using
the not necessarily optimal choice of µ = t = 1/2, we
obtain Rf = [1 − H(ǫ)]/2 implying that we can achieve
a nonzero secrecy rate as long as ǫ 6= 1/2 irrespective
of the wiretapper channel conditions. Hence, even for half-
duplex nodes, noisy feedback from the destination allows for
transmitting information securely for almost any wiretap BSC.
Finally, we compare the performance of different schemes in
some special cases of the wiretap BSC.
1) ǫ = δ = 0.
As mentioned above, here we have Cs = Cps = 0. It
is easy to verify that the optimal choice of µ and t are
1/2, and we thus have Rfs = 1/2.
2) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2 and N1(i) = N2(i) + N ′(i), where
Pr{N
′
(i) = 1} = (ǫ − δ)/(1− 2δ).
The main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap
channel, so Cs = Cps = 0. But by setting µ = t = 1/2
in our half-duplex noisy feedback scheme, we obtain
Rfs = [1−H(ǫ)]/2.
The extension to the general discrete modulo-additive chan-
nel is natural. The destination can set X1 = Z , and generates
X1(i) with a certain distribution PX1 . At time i, if the ran-
domly generated X1(i) 6= 0, the destination sends a feedback
signal, incurring an erasure to itself. On the other hand, if
X1(i) = 0, it does not send the feedback signal and spends
the time listening to the source. The achievable performance
could be calculated based on the equivalent channels as done
in the BSC. This scheme guarantees a positive secrecy capacity
as seen in the case where PX1 is chosen to be uniformly
distributed over Z . This is because a uniform distribution over
Z renders the output at the wiretapper independent from the
source input, i.e., I(W ;Z) = 0, while the destination can still
spend 1/|Z| part of the time listening to the source. Finding
the optimal distribution PX1 , however, is tedious.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained the secrecy capacity (or
achievable rate) for several instantiations of the wiretap chan-
nel with noisy feedback. More specifically, with a full duplex
destination, it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of
modulo-additive channels is equal to the capacity of the
source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper.
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity is achieved with a simple
scheme in which the destination randomly chooses its feed-
back signal from a certain finite alphabet. Interestingly, with
a slightly modified feedback scheme, we are able to achieve
a positive secrecy rate for the half duplex channel. We have
shown that this paradigm significantly outperforms the public
discussion approach for sharing private keys between the
source and destination. Our results motivate several interesting
directions for future research. For example, characterizing the
secrecy capacity of arbitrary DMCs (and the AWGN channel)
with feedback remains an open problem. From an algorithmic
perspective, it is also important to understand how to exploit
different channel structures (in addition to the modulo-additive
one) for encryption purposes. Finally, extending our work to
multi-user channels (e.g., the relay-eavesdropper channel [8])
is of considerable interest.
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